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THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE IN THE STATE COURTS
When the modem Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in
1938, considerable doubt and controversy arose concerning the broad provisions for deposition and discovery. 1 That controversy can be fairly
described as a conflict both of emotion and of basic philosophy. Many
lawyers engaged in the daily maneuvering of the adversary process naturally
tended to defend a system which put a high premium on their individual
abilities. 2 Others were able to stand back and look at the trial practice
of the day with some concern for basic incongruities. Too often, they felt,
the obtaining of truth in fair trials was frustrated by surprise and incomplete presentation of facts. Furthermore, many cases were tried which
would have been settled had the parties had more complete knowledge of
the facts before they began. Broad discovery procedures aimed at full
disclosure of facts before trial were thought necessary to encourage settlements and to promote fairer, more efficient trials.3 Very little broadside
criticism of extensive pretrial discovery now appears,4 and one might fairly
assume that the benefits it was predicted would accompany broad discovery have been realized at least in substantial part. This assumption as
to general success is further buttressed by the fact that, since 1938, discovery procedures identical with or similar to those of the Federal Rules
have been adopted in at least thirty states.5 It is clear that this number is
FED. R. CIV. P. 26-37.
See Tolman, Discovery Under the Federal Rules: Production of Documents and the
Work Product of the Lawyer, 58 CoLUM. L. REv. 498 (1958).
a Ibid.
4 Clark, The Practical Operation of Discovery, 12 F.R.D. 131 (1952); Speck, The Use of
Discovery in United States District Courts, 60 YALE L.J. 1132 (1951); Wright, Wegner &
Richardson, Practicing Attorney's View of the Utility of Discovery, 12 F.R.D. 97 (1952).
5 This classification has been made with a view to whether the state has retained
admissibility at trial as a limitation on its discovery procedures. That such a classification
is somewhat arbitrary is illustrated by recent experience in Michigan. MICH. GEN. CT. R.
302.2(1) limits the scope of discovery by a requirement of admissibility at trial, as did the
preceding rules. MICH. CT. R. 35, § 6. By reading the admissibility requirement broadly
to include matters which are admissible for any purpose (e.g., impeachment), the Michigan
court has broadened the scope of discovery to a point where a significant number of
work product questions may arise. Wilson v. Saginaw Circuit Judge, 370 Mich. 404, 122
N.W.2d 57 (1963); Kalamazoo Yellow Cab v. Kalamazoo Circuit Judge, 363 Mich. 384,
109 N.W.2d 821 (1961); Banaszkiewicz v. Baun, 359 Mich. 109, 101 N.W.2d 306 (1960).
See also King, Limitations on Discovery, Mich. S.B.J. Dec. 1963, p. 13; Meisenholder, The
New Michigan Pre-Trial Procedural Rules-Models for Other States? 61 MICH. L. REv.
1389, 1428 (1963).
1
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growing and that pressure will mount in the remaining states for increased
discovery opportunities.6 The arguments for and against the basic decision
to broaden discovery have been ably presented elsewhere.7 This comment
will deal solely with problems in the important area which has come to be
known as "work product" doctrine. The experience of the federal courts
indicates that any state which seeks to broaden its discovery rules must
eventually face up to the recurring problems in this area.
In general terms, the work product doctrine is concerned with protecting a party's trial preparations from disclosure under the modern
discovery procedures. The protection of work product must be distinguished
from the attorney-client privilege. The two concepts often appear side-by•
side in the cases since both may involve protection of trial preparations.8
The attorney-client privilege is, however, generally viewed as an evidentiary
privilege belonging to the client and designed to encourage full disclosure
by him to his attorney. 9 This is the approach espoused by Professor Wigmore10 and expressly adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States
for purposes of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.11 In some states the
privilege has been viewed as protecting some trial preparatory materials
which are not in the form of disclosures by the client to the attomey. 12
Also, opinions have differed as to precisely what matters fall within the
category of a client's "disclosures."18 Material which falls within the
attorney-client privilege is protected from discovery not because it is inadmissible at trial, but because the discovery rules specifically provide that
the production of privileged matter shall not be ordered.H Thus, in this
one instance the scope of the rule of admissibility at trial is coterminous
with the scope of discovery. Discovery of trial preparations which fall outside evidentiary privileges can be avoided, however, only on the basis of
protection furnished by the discovery rules themselves and not on the basis
of inadmissibility at trial. An important interrelationship of the attorneyclient privilege with the work product doctrine is apparent. To the extent
that a given matter falls within the privilege, there is no need for work
product protection. Likewise, if the attorney-client privilege is construed
narrowly, the need for work product protection may• be substantially in•
creased.
Just as there appears to be general agreement as to the desirability of
broad discovery procedures, there appears also to be general agreement
that there is some need for the protection of a party's trial preparations.
See generally Wright, Procedural Reform in the States, 24 F.R.D. 85 (1959).
Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARv. L. R.Ev. 940 (1961).
s Such was the case in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), itself. See notes 17-19
infra and accompanying text.
9 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§§ 2290-92 (McNaughton ed. 1961).
10 Ibid.
11 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 509 (1947).
12 See notes 43, 82 infra and accompanying text.
18 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 8, §§ 2294-320.
H FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b).
6
7
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It is thought that laziness and sloppy trial preparation would be encouraged if the lawyer who has not made a thorough investigation and study
were allowed to appropriate the fruits of such labors as have been expended
on the other side.15 The Federal Rules are singularly uninformative on
the question of protecting trial preparations which fall outside traditional
categories of privilege.16 The Rules do require that the party seeking
discovery show "good cause" for the disclosure, at least where writings
or other physical items are sought.17 The "good cause" requirement has
properly been given a liberal reading, no extensive showing of justification
being thought necessary.18 It is generally considered sufficient that the
factual disclosure would aid in the preparation of the party's case or be
reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence.19 The party must
also show that the information sought could not otherwise be obtained
without substantial inconvenience.20 This is not to say, however, that the
concept of "good cause" has not been helpful in obtaining protection for
trial preparations.21
The fact remains that much trial preparation material is replete with
information which might very well lead to admissible evidence and which
is not immediately accessible to the adverse party. The Federal Rules make
no explicit provision for the protection of such materials. Nevertheless,
in the case of Hickman v. Taylor22 the Supreme Court read into the
Federal Rules a limited protection of trial preparations beyond that available through privilege and the good cause requirement. In Hickman,
discovery was sought of certain statements of witnesses which had been
personally procured by an attorney in the process of preparing for litigation. The attorney-client privilege was held inapplicable,28 but the Court
thought that, without a strong showing of need, a party ought not to be
allowed access to these statements by discovery.24 The protection provided
to work product was to be greater than that which was provided by the
"good cause" requirement.25 However, unlike the protection afforded by
a privilege, the immunity established by the work product principle was
15 "Were such materials open to opposing counsel on mere demand, much of what is
now put down in writing would remain unwritten. An attorney's thoughts, heretofore
inviolate, would not be his own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would
inevitably develop ••••" Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,511 (1946).
16 This problem was quickly recognized, and a number of solutions were suggested.
Tolman, supra note 2.
17 Fm. R. CIV. P. 34.
18 2A BARRON 8e HoLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACfICE AND PROCEDURE § 796, at 417 (Rules ed.
1961).
19 Id. at 420.
20 Id. at 417-18.
21 E.g., Diniero v. United States Lines Co., 21 F.R.D. 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
22 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
23 Id. at 508.
24' Id. at 511-12.
25 2A BARRON 8e HoLTZOFF, op. cit. supra note 18, at 419. But compare the confusing
use of terminology in Alltmont v. United States, 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1949).
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intended to be qualified. 26 The language of the Court in the Hickman
case is capable of being read broadly, so as to give extensive protection
to a party's trial preparations,27 but, on its facts, the case can be narrowly
construed. Therefore it is not surprising that in the absence of further
holdings by the Supreme Court, the lower federal courts have gone in every
conceivable direction in applying the Hickman "work product" doctrine. 28
While the doctrine has on occasion been limited to the protection of information and materials which result from the trial attorney's personal
effort,29 it has in other instances been extended to protect the efforts of a nonlawyer agent of a litigant.30 While sufficient need for disclosure has sometimes been held to exist where substantial inconvenience would otherwise
result to the proponent of discovery, 31 other cases have demanded nearly
• absolute necessity.32
Adding to the confusion is the fact that, prior to the Supreme Court's
decision of Hickman v. Taylor, the Advisory Committee on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure submitted a proposed amendment to Rule 30(b),
adding the following language:
"The court shall not order the production or inspection of any
writing obtained or prepared by the adverse party, his • attorney,
surety, indemnitor, or agent in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial unless satisfied that denial of production or inspection
will unfairly prejudice the party seeking the production or inspection
in preparing his claim or defense or will cause him undue hardship
or injustice. The court shall not order the production or inspection
of any part of the writing that reflects an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories, or, except as provided
in Rule 35, the conclusions of an expert."33
The Court refused to adopt this Ianguage,34 and the significance of its
refusal has been argued both ways. 85 Those who prefer a reading of
Hickman which limits it as closely as possible to its facts argue that the
amendment was refused because it was unduly restrictive of the scope of
discovery. 36 Others have felt that Hickman itself was broad enough to
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
See Hauger v. Chicago, R.I. &: P.R.R., 216 F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 1954); Alltmont v.
United States, 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1949).
28 4 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1f 26.23(8] (2d ed. 1963).
29 De Bruce v. Pennsylvania R.R., 6 F.R.D. 403 (E.D. Pa. 1947). See also 4 MooRE, op.
cit. supra note 28, ,r 26.23(8.-1), at 1382.
30 Alltmont v. United States, 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1949).
31 Newell v. Capital Transit Co., 7 F.R.D. 732 (D.D.C. 1948).
32 Alltmont v. United States, 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1949).
33 ADVISORY COMMITIEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF PROPOSED AMEND·
MENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES
39-40 (1946).
84 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b) has been left unchanged.
35 The Court did not explain its refusal to adopt the amendment.
36 2A BARRON &: HoLTZOFF, op. cit. supra note 14, § 652.2, at 130.
26
27
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obviate any need for additional language in the Rules. 37 Whatever the
Court's intent may have been, what is important to states as they determine
the proper scope of their discovery procedures in the work product area
is that the Federal Rules, and the federal cases do not present a helpful
model which can be easily followed. The unsettled state of the federal
authorities is indicative of the lack of consensus among judges and lawyers
as to the proper balance to be struck in protecting trial preparations. If
it is proper to recognize some area of protection for trial preparation, then
it would hardly seem to follow that an extension beyond a narrow reading
of Hickman v. Taylor should be condemned as ipso facto contrary to the
policy of broad discovery. On the other hand, each instance in which
information is protected from discovery must be recognized as a potential
inroad on the policy favoring full factual discovery as an encouragement
of settlements and fairness at trial. No particular approach to the balancing
of these considerations appears destined for universal acceptance. Nevertheless, whatever the approach adopted by a state, it should represent a conscious attempt to balance the conflicting policies.
FEDERAL RULES ADOPTED WITHOUT MODIFICATION

In light of the continuing importance of the work product problem
and the need for certainty of planning and efficient judicial administration,
it is not easy to understand why a state would adopt the Federal Rules
without modification or explanation in the work product area. Ten states,
however, have done just that. 38 Such a strict copying of the Federal Rules
stands as an invitation to apply the federal precedents. In fact, where the
question has been considered, it has been explicitly indicated that such an
application is the proper method of construction.39 However, to refer a
state's courts and lawyers to an ever-increasing list of federal decisions,
which support conflicting results on many specific points,40 invites confusion. Not only is there a possibility of misinterpretation of the federal
cases individually, but there is the further danger of failing to appreciate
the variations of doctrine from circuit to circuit. There is also a real hazard
that, as in two recent Arizona decisions,41 interpretation of large numbers
of federal precedents will be substituted for a coherent consideration of
the policies involved. In Dean v. Superior Court the Arizona court engaged
37 See Clark, Experience Under the Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 8 F.R.D. 497, 502 (1949).
88 ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 474(9) (1960); Aruz. R. CIV. P. 26-34; ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-348 to
-356 (1962); CoLO. R. CIV. P. 26-34; DEL. R. CIV. P. 26-34 (modification of Federal Rules
on immaterial points); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1.21-.31 (1952); GA. CODE §§ 38-2101 to -2109
(1959); N.M.R. Cxv. P. 21-1-1(26)-(34) (additions to Federal Rules on immaterial points);
N.D.R. CIV. P. 26-34; WYO. R. CIV. P. 26-34.
so E.g., Ex parte Denton, 266 Ala. 279, 96 So. 2d 296 (1957); Graham v. Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
40 See notes 28-32 supra and accompanying text.
41 State v. Whitman, 91 Ariz. 120, 370 P.2d 273 (1962); Dean v. Superior Court,
84 Ariz. 104, 324 P.2d 764 (1958). See also Comment, 1 ARrz. L. REv. 112 (1959).
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in a baffling discussion of federal cases. 42 At the outset the court was misled
by language in Alltmont v. United States4 3 and concluded that statements
of witnesses, even when taken by an attorney, are to be disclosed upon a
showing of "good cause." 44 At the same time the court appears to have
accorded absolute protection to memoranda purporting to set forth the
substance of witnesses' statements.45 The court asserted that this distinction represents the view of the Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor,
but the language cited was from the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Jackson. 46 It is clear on the facts of the Hickman case itself that the work
product doctrine therein expressed is to apply to actual statements of witnesses.47 This is not to say that the statement-versus-memorandum distinction drawn by the Arizona court is not defensible in substance. The method
of reaching the conclusion, however, is totally undesirable, for the initial
confusion within the federal cases is now compounded by the misinterpretation of those cases. Similar confusion appeared in State v. TVhitman, 48
where discovery of an expert witness' findings was sought. Here a substantial split among the federal cases put the court in the desirable position of being able to pick and choose, although this course left the bar
guessing as to which cases the court might find convincing.
Incongruity was compounded in a recent Delaware case49 where the
court held that its decisions prior to the adoption of the state's version of
the Federal Rules,50 which decisions had extended the scope of the attorneyclient privilege to witness statements gathered by an attorney, were applicable to the new rules of discovery. Despite this marked difference from the
federal view on the closely related question of privilege, the Delaware court
expressly sanctioned the citation of federal decisions on the scope of work
product protection. This attempt to apply federal work product doctrine
while retaining state notions of a broad attorney-client privilege illustrates
an additional hazard of the adoption by a state of the Federal Rules
without modifications in the work product area. Reference has already been
made to the close interrelationship of the work product doctrine with the
attorney-client privilege.51 The breadth and importance of the work product doctrine is a result, in part, of a narrow view of the privilege. It is not
at all clear that a satisfactory approach to work product problems can be
achieved by reference to federal doctrine without concurrent adoption
of the federal view of the scope of the attorney-client privilege. 52
42 84 Ariz. 104,324 P.2d 764 (1958).
43

44
45
46
47
48

49

II7 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1949).
Dean v. Superior Court, 84 Ariz.104, IIO, 324 P.2d 764,768 (1958).
Id. at ll2-13, 324 P.2d at 769.
329 U.S. 495, 516-17.
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 498 (1947).
91 Ariz. 120, 370 P.2d 273 (1962).
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).

50 DEL. R. CIV. P.
51 See notes 8-14 supra and
52 See notes 9-ll supra and

accompanying text.
accompanying text.
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Discovery in general, and in the area of trial preparations in particular,
is almost universally narrower under state rules than it is under the Federal
Rules. 118 It is not surprising, therefore, that the general tendency of the
courts in applying state versions of the Federal Rules has been to favor
broad protection of work product. For example, the leading Florida case
of Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Allen114 held that the doctrine of the Hickman case applies to all "work product of the adverse party, and it matter[s]
not whether the product is the creature of the party, his agent or his
attorney."115 Broad protection of trial preparations is not necessarily to be
criticized, but to reach this result by picking and choosing among conflicting federal cases is to avoid the careful balancing of policy which should
underlie the work product doctrine.
EXPRESS WORK PRODUCT PROVISIONS

The states that have adopted broad pre-trial discovery have commonly
done so by extensive duplication of the federal provisions.116 However,
most of these states have gone beyond the general wording of the Federal
Rules and bare reliance upon federal decisions in dealing with the area of
work product. The most popular approach in these states is to insert a
provision identical with or similar to that which was suggested by the
Federal Advisory Committee,117 but rejected by the United States Supreme
Court.118 Why these states adopted the Committee's suggested provision
and what they felt they were accomplishing by doing so are not at all clear.
It has been suggested that the most important reason for the adoption is
to avoid the entire "work product" problem.119 In some states, however,
the adoption seems to have been merely an attempt to insure that the
doctrine of the Hickman case would be applied. 60 If the intent was to
adopt in specific terms the work product doctrine of the federal courts,
then that intent was doomed to frustration. The rule suggested by the
113 See discussion infra notes 89-103. Only in California and possibly Wisconsin has
there been any attempt to make discovery broader than that provided in the Federal
Rules.
M 40 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1949).
1111 Id. at 116. See also Arizona cases cited note 41 supra.
116 Only in New York, California, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin bas broad discovery
been provided by rules of substantially original form. N.Y. CIV. PRAc. LAw §§ 3101-3134;
CAL. Cxv. PRoc. CoDE §§ 2016-35 (Supp. 1963); PA. R. Cxv. P. 4001-25; WIS STAT• .ANN.
§§ 326.01-.29 (Cum. Supp. 1963).
157 See note 34 supra and accompanying text. Such provisions include: IDAHO R. CIV. P.
26(b); IowA R. CIV. P. 14l(a); KY. CT. R. 37.02; LA. CODE CIV. PROC. .ANN. art. 1452 (1960);
ME. R. CIV. P. 26(b); MD. R. CIV. P. 410d; NEV. R. CIV. P. 30(b); N.J.R. CIV. PRAc. 4:16-2;
UTAH R. Cxv. P. 30(b); WASH. R. CIV. P. 26(b); W. VA. CIV. PRAC. R. 34(b).
118 Sec note 34 supra and accompanying text.
119 Clay, May the Federal Rules Be Successfully Adopted To Improve State Procedure?
The Kentucky Experience, 24 F.R.D. 437,442 (1960).
oo Sec note to UTAH R. Cxv. P. 30(b), 9 UTAH CODE ANN. 560 (1963): "Although the
Supreme Court of the United States failed to adopt the foregoing amendment, it bas
made an interpretation of the Rule [referring to Hickman v. Taylor] which reaches the
same result, in effect, as the amendment does."
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Federal Advisory Committee and rules of like wording call for a broader
limitation on the scope of discovery than the rule which might be gleaned
from the vast majority of the federal decisions. 61 First, the Committee's
rule expressly applies the substantial justification requirement of Hickman
to writings obtained or prepared by the adverse party, his surety, indemnitor; or agent, as well as those of the attorney. 62 It is thus a litigant's
trial preparation and not merely his attorney's which constitutes the work
product. This is the result under some federal cases,68 but contrary holdings can be found. 64 Second, the Committee's proposed rule articulates the
substantial justification requirement in terms of unfair prejudice and
undue hardship or injustice.65 As discussed above, the federal cases have
varied significantly in their formulations of the substantial justification
required under the Hickman case.66 Third, in the second sentence of the
rule, the Committee's amendment provides a substantial area of absolute
protection for the attorney's trial preparation materials.67 Hickman explicitly rejected any rule of absolute protection beyond the attorney-client
privilege.68 The potential breadth of this second sentence has not been
widely recognized. For example, significant portions of a witness' statement, when given in response to an attorney's interrogation, might be said
to reflect the attorney's' "mental impressions" or "legal theories" through
the questions he asks.
In most of the states where the proposed amendment to the Federal
Rules has been adopted, the amendment has gone substantially or completely without interpretation. However, a number of significant decisions
indicating attitudes toward the provision have appeared. The decisions
have tended toward broad protection of work product-broad at least in
comparison to that afforded by the federal rule as it appears to be developing and thus broad in the minds of those who thought of the amendment
as substantially a codification of the Hickman rule. The most striking
example of this trend is a New Jersey case69 in which the disclosure of
names and addresses of a party's expert witnesses was held to have been
properly refused. Perhaps the example is too striking, for the procedure
adopted by the New Jersey court was not merely a strict application of
the work product rule, but was in fact a clear misapplication of the rule in
61 See notes 32-36 supra and accompanying text. See also cases cited note 73 infra.
62 Cf. sources cited note 29 supra.
63 E.g., Hauger v. Chicago, R.I. 8e P.R.R., 216 F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 1954).
64 E.g., De Bruce v. Pennsylvania R.R., 6 F.R.D. 403 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
65 Cf. cases cited notes 31-32 supra.
66 Ibid.
67 "The court shall not order the production or inspection of any part of the writing

that reflects an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories, or,
except as provided in Rule 35, the conclusions of an expert." ADVISORY Cm,(MrITEE ON
RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF Cl\'IL
PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 39 (1946).
68 329 U.S. at 5ll.
69 Gibilterra v. Rosemawr Homes, 19 N.J. 166, ll5 A.2d 553 (1955).
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the light of underlying policy considerations. The availability of such
names and addresses will not encourage the adversary to be sloppy in his
trial preparations. On the contrary, he will be encouraged to make a
thorough investigation of the expert's qualifications so as to protect his
client from any disadvantage at trial. Likewise, the name and address of
the witness will rarely be revealing of the opponents' legal theories and
tactics. This is not to say that justice is better served by giving access to
this information, but, if names and addresses of witnesses are to be protected from disclosure, work product is not the proper theory to be used. 70
Although one might well argue with the results which have flowed
from the form and interpretation of the Advisory Committee's amendment,
the adoption of that amendment has had one commendable result. It
has enabled the states to attack work product with a clean slate and to
consider their limitations on the scope of discovery in the light of what
they believe to be the proper balancing of competing policies. Expressly
and by implication, the courts have rejected recourse to the mass of conflicting federal cases as a method of interpreting their rules.71 No case has
been found in which a court has said that the Committee's rule as adopted
in the state was intended to be a codification of Hickman v. Taylor, thus
making federal cases applicable, although such an intention does seem to
have underlain adoption in some states.72 Having thus rejected federal
precedent on work product, the state court has at least an opportunity to
undertake a meaningful analysis of the problem which faces it, 73 even
though the form of the rule restricts the permissible scope of the inquiry.
WORK PRODUCT "PruvlLEGE" PROVISIONS

A third approach to the protection of trial preparations has been to
extend an absolute privilege not to disclose in the course of pre-trial
discovery procedures. Five states-Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Texas-have adopted this approach.74 Their rules in effect
establish a work product privilege by extending absolute protection to the
matters which would be afforded only qualified protection by the provision suggested by the Federal Advisory Committee. The Minnesota and
Missouri rules were obviously adapted from the Committee's language.75
70 It is notable that immediately after this case the New Jersey rule was amended to
call for disclosure of the identity and location of expert witnesses for the purpose of
allowing the adverse party to investigate the expert's qualifications. N.J. REv. RuLE 4:16-2.
71 State v. Bair, 83 Idaho 475, 365 P.2d 216 (1961); Bender v. Eaton, 343 S.W.2d 799
(Ky. 1961); Dawson v. Lindsey, 143 So. 2d 150 (La. App. 1962).
72 See text accompanying notes 38-39 supra.
73 State v. Bair, 83 Idaho 475, 365 P.2d 216 (1961); Stephan v. Lacorte, 77 N.J. Super.
443, 186 A.2d 713 (L. 1962).
74 ILL. SUP. CT. R. 19-5(1); MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.02; Mo. R. CIV. P. 57.0l(b); PA. R.
CIV. P. 4011; TEX. R. CIV. P. 167, 186a.
75 E.g., MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.02 includes this language: "The production or inspection
of any writing obtained or prepared by the adverse party, his attorney, surety, indemnitor,
or agent in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial, or of any writing that
reflects an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories, or, except
as provided in Rule 35, the conclusions of an expert, shall not be required."
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The other states have produced their own wordings, but the provmons
amount to the same thing on their face. 76 The wisdom of this broad privilege approach can best be judged by considering an area in which work
product questions frequently arise-the statements of witnesses. For example, a truck driver collides with plaintiff's car at an intersection, and
an agent of the truck driver's employer obtains the names of the witnesses
and goes to get their statements. Such statements may well contain important factual information, knowledge of which will facilitate the uncovering of truth and may encourage settlement of the claim. In this case
an order of disclosure would surely militate in favor of the goals of modem
discovery rules.77 However, the results of allowing plaintiff to compel this
disclosure are not entirely desirable. In the first place, it would not be
quite fair to allow plaintiff to sit back while the defendant diligently
procures information on the transaction and then to appropriate the fruits
of the latter's labor. Such a practice would encourage sloppy trial preparation rather than the thorough preparation the discovery rules were designed to make possible. Second, in at least some instances, as discussed
above, 78 the witnesses' statements may reflect the interrogating party's
legal theories. Therefore, in many cases, the work product objection would
seem properly to be interposed. It would seem no undue hardship on the
plaintiff to require that he himself go and talk to the witness. In this
way the party gets the information which the law would want him to have,
without unfair advantage.
Suppose, however, that a given witness has died or moved half-way
around the world. Here the balance of competing policies is significantly
changed. The policy of broad discovery rules continues to favor disclosure,
but there is no longer an available alternative for the effectuation of that
policy. Likewise, allowing disclosure will no longer encourage sloppy trial
preparation, for in such cases the party could not, except perhaps at pro•
hibitive expense, have obtained the information independently. The policy
behind the extension of privilege to this information seems then to rest
upon the danger of unfair access to the opponents' thoughts and theories
or some even more vague concept of unfairness. If this problem were one
of admissibility at trial, an objection based upon unfairness would hardly
seem to justify an absolute privilege, for the judge could, in his discretion,
determine in each situation whether there would be such an unfair dis•
closure. The absence of an impartial arbiter in many parts of the discovery
process may be important in distinguishing the proper scope of discovery
76 E.g., PA. R. CIV. P. 4011 provides: "No discovery or inspection shall be permitted
which ••• (d) would disclose the existence or location of reports, memoranda, statements,
information or other things made or secured by any person or party in anticipation of
litigation or in preparation for trial or would obtain any such thing from a party or his
insurer, or the attorney or agent of either of them, other than information as to the
identity or whereabouts of witnesses .••."
77 See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
78 See notes 67-68 supra and accompanying text.
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from that of rules of evidence. If it is a proper objection to many rules
of evidence that they draw distinctions which are too fine, too subtle, and
too technical, such an objection would be applicable with even greater
force in discovery proceedings. The infusion of questions of degree into
discovery proceedings may well promote haggling and delay in a process
which is designed to bring increased efficiency to the court system. The
problem thus becomes one of weighing the benefits to be derived from disclosure in proper cases against the detriments of lost efficiency in the process
of determining whether disclosure is proper. A judgment must be made
as to the real dangers of unfair advantage and delay on the one side and,
on the other, the danger of substantial withholding of information which
ought otherwise to be disclosed. Therefore, the broad privilege approach
to work product need not be justified solely on the ground that the opposing
party, as a matter of fairness, ought never to have the protected information. The rule can be said, rather, to represent a judgment that, on balance,
discovery will run more smoothly and justly if the information is protected
absolutely.
Since the dangers of haggling and delay result from the retention of
degree questions as to the scope of discovery, these dangers may be alle•
viated by the elimination of any degree of protection for work product
as well as by the extension of broad privilege. Brief reference should be
made here to the solution to the work product dilemma formerly embraced
by California, discussed more fully below. 79 California determined that
the combined policies of certainty and broad disclosure outweighed the
danger of unfair advantage. Therefore, the broad privilege approach can
not be justified alone by its encouraging of efficiency and dispatch in
discovery proceedings. Rather, it must be justified by a combination of
policy judgments: first, that efficiency requires the elimination of close
questions and, second, that the injustice resulting from exclusion in all
cases is not as great as the injustice in a system which generally allows
discovery.
"
Although the policy balancing represented by a broad work product
privilege might be articulated as indicated above, it has not been so stated.
It is difficult to escape the suspicion that these privilege rules represent, in
fact, a compromise with the lingering fear of the "fishing expedition,"
rather than a reasoned limitation on an otherwise accepted method of
procedure. This lack of articulation of policy has been apparent as well
in the judicial interpretations of the broad privilege rule. A number of
decisions have extended the rule beyond the point where it can possibly
be harmonized with the basic goals of pre-trial discovery. Perhaps the
most striking example is found in the Texas cases in which the cloak of
the work product privilege has been thrown around the names and
addresses of witnesses.80 The precise facts of the cases involved serve to
See notes 89-100 infra and accompanying text.
so E.g., Ex parte Ladon, 160 Tex. 7, 325 S.W.2d 121 (1959); Dallas Ry. & Terminal
Co. v. Oehler, 156 Tex. 488, 296 S.W.2d 757 (1956).
79
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illustrate how indefensible such a rule 1s in light of the competing policies.
In Ex parte Ladon,81 a bus driver compiled a list of the names and
addresses of witnesses following an accident in which he was involved.
Plaintiff had been injured when thrown to the floor of the bus as a result
of a sudden stop. The attorney for the bus company was cited for contempt
when he refused to produce the driver's list for discovery. On appeal, the
refusal was held proper under the court's rules provision for a broad work
product privilege.82 Some history of the rules' adoption was cited to
support the court's interpretation. The Texas court explained that the
extension of the privilege to the identity and location of witnesses was a
product of compromise.83 But the compromise would appear to have been
with the sporting theory of litigation and flatly irreconcilable with the
adoption of broad discovery. The Ladon case presents a stark picture of the
plaintiff lying injured on the floor of the bus while the bus driver busily
compiles his protected list of witnesses.
It seems clear that the policy which underlies a decision such as Ladon
is basically inconsistent with the policy which supports broad discovery
rules in the first instance.84 In order to facilitate the maximum availability
of facts to the parties, the discovery rules are designed to give a party
access to those facts which are within the peculiar control of the adverse
party. In perhaps the vast majority of cases, the protection of witnesses'
statements as work product does no substantial violence to the foregoing
policy. The adverse party can go to the witness on his own to learn the
facts. But, when the names of the witnesses are within the peculiar control
of the other party, no such easy access to the facts is available. Thus, to
protect the names of witnesses is to preclude the party from obtaining the
facts to which the discovery rules were meant to give him access. Surely a
list of names of witnesses cannot reflect the thought processes or legal
theories of the party who has the list, and in many cases it would seem that
possession of the names would be more the result of the fortunes of time
and place than the result of diligent and skillful search.
The Illinois court has reached the opposite result as to names and
addresses of witnesses in a setting substantially similar to that in the
81
82

160 Tex. 7,325 S.W.2d 121 (1959).
Id. at 9, 325 S.W.2d at 123. The proviso reads: "provided that the rights herein

granted shall not extend to the written communications passing between agents or
representatives or the employees of either party to the suit, or communications between
any party and his agents, representatives, or their employees, where made subsequent to
the occurrence or transaction upon which the suit is based, and made in connection with
the prosecution, investigation or defense of such claim or the circumstances out of which
same has arisen. TEX. R. CIV. P. 167."
83 Ex parte Laden, 160 Tex. 7, 11,325 S.W.2d 121, 124 (1959).
84 "No longer can the time-honored cry of 'fishing expedition' serve to preclude a
party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's case. Mutual knowledge of
all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that
end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession."
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
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Ladon case.81S This result is clearly to be preferred. In other cases as well,
the Illinois court has been careful in interpreting its broad privilege rule
to avoid unjustifiable results which might easily flow from a literal reading
of the rule. 86 In the recent case of Stimpert v. Abdnour, 87 the Illinois court
refused protection for the transcript of an interview with the defendant
taken by plaintiff's attorney on the ground that it would be admissible at
trial as an admission of a party. The court went far in reconciling its
privilege rule with the policy of broad discovery:
"The discovery provisions of the Civil Practice Act and our Supreme
Court Rules were enacted to broaden the scope of available discovery
to enhance the true function of a trial as a means of ascertaining the
truth, and to provide methods from [sic] the prompt and just disposition of litigation . . . . Our promulgation of Rule 19-5(1) was not
inconsistent with this philosophy, but was an effort to protect litigants
from unnecessary harassment, and violations of their well recognized
rights . . .. The •.. exemption, sometimes loosely referred to as the
'work product' privilege, was believed necessary to prevent complete
invasion of the files of counsel. It is clear that this exemption would
protect notes and memoranda prepared by counsel for use in trial ....
As properly understood, however, this rule does not protect material
and relevant evidentiary facts from the truth-seeking processes of
discovery." 88
By so restricting the scope of its privilege provision in relation to its broad
discovery rules, the Illinois court has shown that these privilege provisions
can be made to represent a defensible balancing of legitimate policies. It
may be, in fact, that Illinois courts will eventually allow discovery of trial
preparations in more cases than will the federal courts.
REJECTION OF THE WoRK PRonucT DoC'TIUNE
Until recently, in at least one state-California-there was a conscious
effort to make pre-trial discovery broader than that afforded under the
Federal Rules in the area of trial preparation materials. This effort began
with a code provision clearly designed to avoid the confusion of the
federal precedents:
"All matters which are privileged against disclosure upon the trial under
the law of this State are privileged against disclosure through discovery
procedure. This article shall not be construed to change the law of this
Krupp v. Chicago Transit Authority, 8 Ill. 2d 37, 132 N.E.2d 532 (1956).
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 19-5(1) provides: "All matters which are privileged against disclosure upon trial are privileged against disclosure through any discovery procedure.
Disclosure of memoranda, reports or documents made by or for a party in preparation
for trial or any privileged communications between any party or his agent and the attorney
for the party shall not be required through any discovery procedure."
87 24 Ill. 2d 26, 179 N.E.2d 602 (1962).
BB Id. at 31, 179 N.E.2d at 605.
BIS
86
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State with respect to the existence of any privilege, whether provided
for by statute or judicial decision, nor shall it be construed to incorporate by reference any judicial decisions on privilege of any other
jurisdiction."89
This provision accompanied a general adoption by California of the
Federal Rules. In Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court 90 the California
court held that the alteration was made "for the express purpose of creating
in California a system of discovery procedures less restrictive than those
then employed in the federal courts."91 Thus, the provision was held to
have rejected the federal doctrine as well as the individual federal precedents. The net result of the Greyhound holding that the California rule
rejected the federal work product concept was not itself especially farreaching in light of the scope of the California attorney-client privilege,
which extended to reports compiled by a party's agents in anticipation of
litigation.92 But, in the Greyhound case and cases following it,9 3 the
California court expressly rejected its prior view of the scope of the
privilege, limiting it to the scope indicated by Wigmore and adopted by
the Supreme Court in the Hickman case.94
The result of these two developments in California, the rejection of
the work product doctrine and the restriction of the attorney-client privilege,
was to broaden significantly the scope of discovery in the area of trial
preparations. Subsequently, discovery was allowed of reports of a condemner's expert appraiser,95 a report of an engineering firm made expressly
for a party's attorney,96 and pictures taken by a party himself.97 Thus
California placed primary emphasis on the full disclosure of facts through
the discovery process. Implicit in this development was the belief that, in
the bulk of the cases involving the discovery of trial preparations, the fear
of encouraging the sloppy lawyer ought not to be a controlling factor.
In short, California proceeded from the proposition that this material may
be discovered.
The California development ought not to be seen as having given a
blanket license to the adverse party to search at will through his opponent's
trial preparations. The right to discovery was conditioned here, as it is
under the Federal Rules, on a showing of "good cause" in every case. It is
89 Calif. Stat. ch. 1904 (1957).
90 56 Cal. 2d 355, 15 Cal. Rptr. 90, 364 P .2d 266 (1961).
91 Id. at 375, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 98, 364 P.2d at 274.
92 Holm v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 2d 500,267 P.2d 1025
ll3 E.g., Suezaki v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 166, 23

(1954).
Cal. Rptr. 368, 373 P .2d 432

(1962).
94 See notes 9-11 supra.
95 Oceanside Union School Dist. v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 180, 23 Cal. Rptr. 375,
373 P.2d 439 (1962).
96 San Diego Professional Ass'n v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 194, 23 Cal. Rptr. 384,
373 P .2d 448 (1962).
97 Suezaki v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 166, 23 Cal. Rptr. 368,373 P.2d 432 (1962).
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true, as noted above,9 8 that the "good cause" inquiry would not normally
be a rigorous one, and a showing of possible usefulness in obtaining all
relevant information would suffice in most cases. But the California court
clearly stated that "this is not to say that discovery may not be denied, in
proper cases, when disclosure of the attorney's efforts, opinions, conclusions
or theories would be against public policy . . . or would be eminently
unfair or unjust, or would impose an undue burden.'' 99 It remained for the
California courts to give substance to these limitations, and the California
rules might have attained a shape similar to that suggested for the Federal
Rules by those who would read Hickman v. Taylor narrowly.10° Clearly,
however, the path would have been different, for the California court
started with the proposition that benefits of factual disclosures would
normally outweigh any unfairness; only where the preponderant unfairness was actually shown would protection have been given. With no work
product objection as such available to them, California litigants would
have been encouraged to limit their objections to cases of true prejudice.
Likewise, the court would have determined the proper degree of protection
from discovery faced not with the question of what is "work product," but
rather what is fair, thus avoiding a tyranny of labels. Some commentators
questioned whether the benefits of additional disclosure of facts would
even have begun to balance the mischief which the new California doctrine
invited. 101 But it would seem to have been worthy of a period of fair trial.
It is unfortunate that this fresh attempt to re-examine the proper scope
of discovery has been somewhat frustrated by restrictive legislation. Recent
amendments to the California Code of Civil Procedure provide:
"The work product of an attorney shall not be discoverable unless
the court determines that denial of discovery will unfairly prejudice
the party seeking discovery in preparing his claim or defense or will
result in an injustice, and any writing that reflects an attorney's
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories shall
not be discoverable under any circumstances. . . . It is the policy of
this State (i) to preserve the rights of attorneys to prepare cases for
trial with that degree of privacy necessary to encourage them to prepare
their cases thoroughly and to investigate not only the favorable but
the unfavorable aspects of such cases and (ii) to prevent an attorney.
from taking undue advantage of his adversary's industry or efforts."102
See notes 17-20 supra and accompanying text.
Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 401, 15 Cal. Rptr. 90, 115,
364 P.2d 266,291 (1961). (Emphasis added.)
100 In Suezaki v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 166, 23 Cal. Rptr. 368, 373 P.2d 432 (1962),
the California court indicated that the two approaches might well reach similar results.
Clearly a California court will be hesitant to give access to an attorney's mental processes
or legal theories.
101 Committee on the Administration of Justice, Report, 37 CAL. S.B.J. 585, 586-87
(1962); Masterson, Discovery of Attorney's Work Product Under Section 2031 of the
California Code of Civil Procedure, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 575 (1963); Comment, 10 U.C.L.A.L.
REv. 593 (1963).
102 CAL. CIV. PRoc. CoDE §§ 2016(b), (g) (Supp. 1963).
98
119
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Also added was a provision for a stricter "good cause" inquiry:
"A party required to show 'good cause' to obtain discovery . . . shall
show specific facts justifying discovery and mere proof of the relevance
of the information sought to the subject matter of the action shall not
be sufficient." 103
On their face, these provisions would hardly seem to be a statutory
confirmation of judicially established rules.104 The policy statement in
the amendment is not in conflict with that declared previously by the
courts, and this might be viewed as an invitation to continue as before.
The other quoted provisions, however, belie any such legislative intent.
Speculation as to the consequences of the new provisions in particular
cases would not be fruitful here. Whatever may now be protected from
discovery. in California, the advantages of the approach under the Greyhound decision have been lost. Whereas the fact that a given matter was
part of a lawyer's trial preparations was formerly but one factor in determining the justice of allowing discovery, it now provides prima facie
protection. The central inquiry has shifted from what is fair to what is
"work product." It should be noted that the work product provisions relate
only to the lawyer's trial preparations. But the general restriction of the
"good cause" requirement will serve to narrow the scope of discovery as to
all types of matter.
Desirable freedom in determining the proper scope of broadened
discovery rules may, however, lie ahead for Wisconsin. This state has stood
as a leader in broadening pre-trial discovery by independent formulation
of rules. The results of such independence give the impression that a great
deal more thought and deliberation went into the formulation of these
rules than is apparent where the Federal Rules have been simply adopted,
virtually in toto. In 1961, Wisconsin broadened the scope of its discovery
by adopting the following provision eliminating an admissibility requirement:
"A deponent shall be examined regarding any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the controversy, but it shall not be grounds for
objection that testimony will be inadmissible at trial if testimony sought
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence." 105
In the first case interpreting this provision, the Wisconsin court indicated
its determination to avoid federal precedent and at least some of the
limitations of the federal work product doctrine. In State ex rel. Reynolds v.
Circuit Court, 106 an action challenging a condemnation award, discovery
103 CAL. CIV. PROC. ConE § 2036(a) (Supp. 1963).
104 But see Brown v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. Rptr. 527, 534 (Ct.
105 WIS. STAT. § 326.12(2) (1962).
10s 15 Wis. 2d 311, 112 N.W.2d 686 (1961), rehearing denied,

App. 1963).
113 N.W.2d 537 (1962).
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was held to be properly granted of opinions of the state's expert appraisal
witnesses. In dismissing the argument for work product protection the
court declared:
"To whatever extent the principle of the Hickman case is to be
followed in limiting discovery procedure in this state, we conclude that
it provides no basis for refusing plaintiffs the opportunity of examining
these expert witnesses concerning the relevant opinions they have
formed, and the observations, knowledge, information, and theories on
which the opinions are based." 107
The court expressly recognized that there was contrary authority under the
Federal Rules. 108 Thus Wisconsin seems to have combined an independence
of federal precedent with a tendency to grant a broader scope of discovery
which could lead to results similar to those in California prior to the
recent statutory restrictions. At least, in the absence of a "work product"
provision in the statutes, there is room for a case-by-case development with
an emphasis on the fairness in each case.
CONCLUSION

Broad rules of pre-trial discovery are based on a determination that, in
general, the benefits of full disclosure outweigh its unavoidable dangers.
Encouraging settlements and promoting fair trials are the goals; use for
harassment and the promotion of sloppy trial preparations are prominent
dangers. Nearly all limitations which are placed upon the scope of discovery will, to some degree, hamper the realization of the goals of the
broad rules. The limitation may be justified where the dangers avoided
can fairly be said to outweigh the benefits which are lost. Thus, in the work
product area, the protection from disclosure of a given matter may encourage diligent trial preparation without substantially hindering full
factual disclosure. Such a limitation is clearly justifiable. It is just such
a balancing of benefits and dangers which should underlie the implementation of the work product concept.
In choosing the best method of administering a work product limitation,
considerations of efficiency in application are proper. Here, too, if the
benefits in efficiency of administration of a rule can be demonstrated, they
may outweigh the detriments involved in preventing full disclosure. On
such a basis a work product "privilege" rule may be found superior to the
more flexible and qualified protection vouchsafed under the Federal Rules.
The danger to be avoided is that of the adoption of limitations upon discovery which are not responsive to real dangers. Such limitations are a
source of back.door attack on the policy of full disclosure which underlies.
modem discovery.
John S. Holbrook, Jr.
101
10s

Id. at 321, 112 N.W.2d at 691.
Ibid.

